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NOTE
Constitutional Law: Roemhild v. State and State v.
Popanz: Their Effect on the Constitutionality of
Oklahoma's Compulsory Education Statute
Compulsory education statutes can be divided into three categories, each
according to the type of schools children are required to attend.' The first
category may be referred to as "no exception" statutes.2 These statutes re-
quire a child's attendance at either a public or a private school, with no other
exceptions. The second category may be referred to as the "explicit excep-
tion" statutes.3 These statutes allow attendance at either a public, a private,
or "other" school. In addition, these statutes allow an explicit exception for
an approved home education program.
Oklahoma's statute is representative of the third category, which may be
referred to as an "equivalency" statute.' In Oklahoma, it is mandatory that
1. For a more thorough discussion on the different categories of compulsory education statutes,
see Tobak & Zirkel, Home Instruction: An Analysis of the Statutes and Case Law, 8 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 1 (1982); Lines, Private Education Alternatives and State Regulation, 12 J.L. & EDUC.
(Apr. 1983).
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-2104 (1976) is an example of such a "no exception" statute.
3. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031 (Vernon Supp. 1985) is an example of an "explicit exception"
statute. "Explicit exception" statutes will not be dealt with in this paper. They represent a much
smaller proportion of education statutes and have provided little difficulty in interpretation. This
may be explained by the relative absence of ambiguity in the statutes. See Tobak & Zirkel, supra
note 1, at 50.
4. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 10-105 (1981) provides:
A. It shall be unlawful for a parent, guardian, custodian or other person having
control of a child who is over the age of seven (7) years and under the age of
eighteen (18) years, and who has not finished four years of high school work, to
neglect or refuse to cause or compel such child to attend and comply with the
rules of some public, private or other school, unless other means of education are
provided for the full term the schools of the district are in session; and it shall
be unlawful for any child who is over the age of sixteen (16) years and under the
age of eighteen (18) years, and who has not finished four (4) years of high school
work, to neglect or refuse to attend and comply with the rules of some public,
private or other school, or receive an education by other means for the full term
of the schools of the district are in session.
The statute also provides for several exceptions to the mandatory attendance requirement and
a possible maximum penalty of fifty dollars and ten days imprisonment. See also 70 OKLA. STAT.
§ 10-106 (1981) (provides guidelines for the recording of pupil attendance); OKLA. CONST. art.
XIII, § 4 (imposes a duty upon the Oklahoma legislature to "provide for the compulsory atten-
dance at some public or other school, unless other means of education are provided, of all the
children in the state who are sound in mind and body, between the ages of eight and sixteen
years, for at least three months in each year.")-
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a parent, guardian, or custodian cause the child or children between the ages
of seven and eighteen in his or her care to attend either a public school, a
private school, an "other" school, or to receive other means of education.
Should the responsible person fail to comply with the statute, criminal sanc-
tions may be imposed by the state.s
Category three statutes may further be broken into two subcategories. The
first is the "explicit equivalence" type in which the equivalency requirement
is specifically provided for in the statute.6 The second is the "implied
equivalence" type, which fails to mention the equivalency requirements.7 The
requirements, therefore, are usually imposed by case law or Attorney General
Opinions interpreting the statute.' Oklahoma's statute is representative of this
more vague second subcategory.
Compliance with Oklahoma's compulsory education statute is not easy for
those who wish to provide their children with an alternative to public educa-
tion. Because of the generality and vagueness of the Oklahoma statute, a parent
might violate the law while he is attempting to comply with its provisions,
or a government official might act improperly while enforcing it. The reasons
for this are twofold. First, Oklahoma law does not provide a parent or an
enforcement official with any definitions as to what constitutes a private school,
"other" school, or other means of education. Second, Oklahoma law does
not provide a parent or an enforcement official with any criteria or guidelines
to determine whether the education provided to a child is equivalent in fact
to that provided by the state. For these reasons, a parent cannot adequately
determine what is required to comply with the statute nor can the responsible
authorities properly enforce it.'
These contentions are supported by two recent state supreme court cases:
Roemhild v. State'" and State v. Popanz." In Roemhild, Georgia's compulsory
education statute was held void for vagueness because it did not adequately
define the phrase "private school."'" Georgia's statute was a category one
5. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 10-105(B) (1981).
6. See Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1981) for an example of a statute in this subcategory.
7. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 10-105(A) (1981).
8. Sheppard v. State, 306 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1957); Wright v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 430,
209 P. 179 (1922); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 129 (Okla. Feb. 13, 1974); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 155
(Okla. May 1, 1972).
9. It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss the propriety of home education or to
address the possibility of an educational malfeasance cause of action in tort. For discussions
on home education, see Lines, supra note 1; Stocklin-Enright, Constitutionalism and the Rule
of Law: New Hampshire's Home Schooling Quandary, 8 VT. L. REv. 265 (1983); Tobak & Zirkel,
supra note 1; Beshoner, Home Education in America: Parental Rights Reasserted, 49 UMKC
L. REy. 191 (1981); Richmond, Home Instruction, 18 J. FAm. L. 353 (1979-80); Note, Constitu-
tional Law: Parent's Right to Educate the Child, 13 OKLA. L. REv. 432 (1960). For a discussion
on an educational malfeasance claim, see Note, Educational Malfeasance: A New Cause of Action
for Failure to Educate?, 14 TULSA L.J. 383 (1978).
10. 251 Ga. 569, 308 S.E.2d 154 (1983).
11. 112 Wis. 2d 166, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983).
12. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-2104 (1976) provided:




"no exception" statute. In Popanz, Wisconsin's statute was held unconstitu-
tional for the same reason,' 3 but in addition because it did not define "substan-
tially equivalent." Wisconsin's statute was a category three "explicit
equivalence" statute. Both statutes were struck down because they did not
provide persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice as to what behavior is
required or prohibited under the statutes, nor did they provide definite stan-
dards or criteria under which the statutes could be enforced by responsible
authorities.' 4 Because of the similarities between the Oklahoma, Georgia, and
Wisconsin compulsory education statutes, there are strong arguments that the
Oklahoma statute is likewise unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Moreover,
differences between the three statutes arguably render the Oklahoma statute
more vague.
In assessing these possibilities, this note will deal with five subtopics. First,
the Roemhild and Popanz opinions will be discussed. Second, the Oklahoma
case law and Attorney General Opinions relating to compulsory education
will be introduced. Third, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Georgia law will be
compared. Fourth, the constitutionality of the Oklahoma statute will be
or charge of any child or children between their seventh and sixteenth birthdays
shall enroll and send such child or children to a public or private school; and such
child shall be responsible for enrolling and attending a public or private school
under such penalty for noncompliance with this subsection as is provided in subsection
(b) of the Code section unless his failure to enroll and attend is caused by his parent,
guardian, or other person, in which case the parent, guardian, or other person
alone shall be responsible; provided, however, that tests and physical exams for
military service and the National Guard and such other absences as may be approved
by the State Board of Education or the local board shall be excused absences....
(b) Any parent, guardian or other person residing in this state who has control
or charge of a child or children and who shall violate this part shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be subject to a fine not to exceed
$100.00 or imprisonment not to exceed 30 days, or both, at the discretion of the
court having jurisdiction. Each day's absence from school is violation of this part
shall constitute a separate offense.
See GA. CODE Atm. § 32-2104 (1984) (for the Georgia legislature's amendments to its unconstitu-
tional compulsory education statute).
13. WIs. STAT. § 118.15(l)(a) (1981) provided in relevant part:
[A]ny person having under control a child who is between the ages of 6 and 18
years shall cause the child to attend school regularly during the full period and
hours, religious holidays excepted, that the public or private school in which the
child should be enrolled is in session until the end of the school term, quarter or
semester of the school year in which the child becomes 18 years of age.
Wis. STAT. § 118.15(4) provided: "Instruction during the required period elsewhere than at school
may be substituted for school attendance. Such instruction must be approved by the state superinten-
dent as substantially equivalent to instruction given to children of like ages in the public or private
schools where such children reside." See Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1984) (for the Wisconsin legislature's
reaction to Popanz).
14. Roemhild v. State, 251 Ga. 569, 308 S.E.2d 154, 158 (1983). See also Village of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 486 (1982); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48
(1975); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 813 (1974); Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 602 (1973);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 102 (1972); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1983) (all cites are sources of discussions on the vagueness principle).
1985]
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assessed. Finally, recommendations for legislative action to cure the Oklahoma
statute of its deficiencies will be proposed.
Roemhild and Popanz
In Roemhild, the defendants were parents of three school-age children. They
were arrested for violating the Georgia compulsory attendance statute by
allegedly failing to enroll their children in a public or a private school according
to the statutory requirements. They defended their actions on the basis that
the children were being taught at home in a private school operated by the
parents themselves.'" Both parents cited religious reasons for their decision
to educate their children at home. 6
At trial, the parents contended that the statute was impermissibly vague
and thus violated their right to due process. The trial judge ruled that the
defendants had not sufficiently raised the constitutional issues and were not
operating a private school within the meaning of the statute. As a result, the
parents were found guilty of nineteen statutory violations, one for each day
the defendants' children were absent from school.'
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the defendants had
properly raised the constitutional issues, and thus the case was validly before
the court. Second, the court held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague
because it failed to provide fair warning to a person of ordinary intelligence
as to what behavior was proscribed and failed to establish minimum criteria
for local authorities to use in determining what constituted a private school. I
In arriving at its decision, the court cited State v. Popanz,"I a recent Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court case whose facts were similar to those in Roemhild. In
Popanz, the defendant was convicted under the Wisconsin compulsory
attendance statute for failing to cause his three children to attend a public
or private school as the statute required. 20 As a result, the defendant was
15. Roemhild v. State, 251 Ga. 569, 308 S.E.2d 154, 155 (1983). At trial, the evidence showed
that neither parent had any formal qualifications to be instructors, nor did either parent hold
a teaching certificate. The extent of the mother's experience was that she had been a substitute
teacher in Sunday and Bible school. The father had no teaching experience whatsoever.
16. Both parents were members of the Worldwide Church of God, and each felt that the
public schools were undesirable because the schools did not transmit the church's religious beliefs
as part of the curriculum. In addition, the parents maintained that public schools were unsafe,
immoral, did not provide a proper education, and had already had a disruptive effect on their
children. The parents reasoned that by teaching their children at home, they could avoid these
undesirable effects. Id., 308 S.E.2d at 155. See also Carper, The Whisner Decision: A Case
Study in State Regulation of Christian Day Schools, 24 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 281 (1982); Arans,
The Separation of Church and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARV. EDUC. Rav. 76 (1976);
Note, The Right to Education: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 44 U. CiN. L. REv. 796 (1975); Knudsen,
The Education of the Amish Child, 62 CAmv. L. REv. 1506 (1974); Marcus, The Forum of Con-
scious: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1217; notes 1-9
supra and accompanying text; notes 63, 64 infra and accompanying text (for discussions on how
the freedom of religion relates to public and private education).
17. Roemhild, 251 Ga. 569, 308 S.E.2d at 156.
18. Id., 308 S.E.2d at 158.
19. 112 Wis. 2d 166, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983).




subjected to criminal sanctions as provided for by Wisconsin law.2 ' On ap-
peal, the defendant argued that section 118.15(1)(a) of the statute was defec-
tive in that neither it nor any other statutes, administrative regulations, or
rules defined the phrase "private school." 22 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
agreed and held the statute to be vague and unconstitutional.
2 3
Following the reasoning in Popanz, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
the Georgia compulsory education statute failed to define private school.
Further, none of Georgia's administrative rules or regulations defined the term
or provided any criteria to evaluate whether a school could be considered
private in compliance with the statute. These facts had two effects. First, per-
sons seeking to comply with the statute had to guess at its meaning. Second,
officials had too much discretion in interpreting and enforcing the statute.
24
In applying these principles of due process to Roemhild, the court held
that the facts of that case more than supported the notion that the state failed
to provide adequate notice to the Roemhilds of what was required of them
to be in compliance with the statute. Specifically, the court noted that the
Roemhilds sought guidance from the statute itself but found no useful infor-
mation. Additionally, the Roemhilds sought help from local and state officials.
From these inquiries, the defendants received a conclusory statement by the
authorities that home education was probably not in compliance with the law,
but nothing of any certainty was conveyed to the defendants.2"
Second, the court concluded that the impermissible delegation of discretion
was perhaps the statute's most notable inadequacy. 6 This was particularly
demonstrated by the State Department of Education's statement to the defen-
dants that the decisions of whether the statute was being violated was solely
up to local law enforcement officials. Without any enforcement criteria, the
court said the statute necessitated that local officials apply their own stan-
dards and predilections concerning education when assessing whether a viola-
tion had occurred. Such ad hoc and subjective standards were held to pose
the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, which is contrary
to due process. 27
21. Wis. STAT. § 118.15(5) provided: "Whoever violates this section may be fined not less
than $5 nor more than $50 or imprisoned not more than 3 months or both, [after evidence
has been provided by the school attendance officer that the activities under § 118.16(5) have
been completed."].
22. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 332 N.W.2d at 754.
23. Id. The court stated:
Like this defendant, we have searched the statutes, administrative rules and regula-
tions and official Department of Public Instruction writings for a definition of
"private school" or criteria which an entity must meet to be classified as a "private
school" for the purposes of § 118.15(l)(a). We have found neither a definition
nor prescribed criteria. Nor does the phrase "private school" have a well settled
meaning in common parlance or in decisions of this court which could be used
for purposes of applying § 118.15(l)(a).
24. Roemhild, 251 Ga. 569, 308 S.E.2d at 158.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id., 308 S.E.2d at 159.
1985]
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Because of the infirmities of the statute, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed
the Roemhilds' convictions. In concluding the opinion, the court proposed
two further clarifications. First, the court stated that in no way was it passing
upon the propriety of home education.28 Second, the court said that although
the word "school" put one on notice that some type of structured education
was mandated, there were many unanswered questions as to the scope, nature,
and place of education. The court indicated that the legislature needed to
clarify these areas in order to cure the statute of its constitutional deficiencies. 29
In Roemhild, three justices dissented on various grounds, two of which
are important to the discussion in this note. 0 First, the dissenters stated that
the Georgia compulsory attendance law had been indirectly upheld in Ander-
son v. State.' In Anderson, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the con-
viction of a defendant who, while allowing his child to attend school, refused
to allow the child to receive immunization against some contagious diseases.
Such injections, the parent alleged, were in violation of his religious beliefs.
The court analogized that the failure to immunize the child was equivalent
to a failure to enroll the child in school (because immunization was a prere-
quisite to the right of attendance). The defendant was thus violating the com-
pulsory attendance statute in a roundabout way. The dissenters said that Ander-
son was ample precedent for upholding the compulsory education statute and
that the facts in Roemhild did not warrant the court's invalidation of the
statute.
Moreover, the dissenters did not find the statute unconstitutionally vague
because the word "school" was easily capable of being defined. In support
of this proposition the dissenters cited Risser v. City of Thomasville.2 In Risser,
the Supreme Court of Georgia relied on a dictionary definition of school.
Under this definition, school was "an organized source of education or train-
ing: as (1) an institution for the teaching of children." ' 3 Because the word
28. Id., 308 S.E.2d at 157.
29. Id., 308 S.E.2d at 158, where the court stated:
A sampling of these questions follows: Must the place of education be an "institu-
tion" which many children attend and which has an influx of new students and
outflux of graduating students every year, or may parents teach or have their children
taught at home? Must the "school" provide for the yearly sequential advancement
of students or may students proceed at their own pace? What facilities, such as
libraries, classrooms, or playing fields must the "school" provide? What must be
the educational background of the teachers-must they be state certified or may
"qualified" persons teach? What kind of curriculum and educational materials must
be provided-must they rigidly compare to public schools or can a "private school"
vary their nature? And, finally, must the time schedule of a "private school" be
consistent with that of a public school?
30. Id., 308 S.E.2d at 159-60.
31. 84 Ga. App. 259, 65 S.E.2d 848 (1951).
32. 248 Ga. 866, 286 S.E.2d 727 (1982). See also Bangor Baptist Church v. State, 549 F.
Supp. 1208 (D. Me. 1982); Attorney Gen'l v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 436 N.W.2d 139 (1982);
State v. Bowman, 60 Or. App. 184, 653 P.2d 254 (1982); State v. Labarge, 134 Vt. 276, 357
A.2d 121 (1976) (all cases upholding vagueness challenges against compulsory education statutes).




"school" had been defined in Risser, the dissenters said there was no need
to invalidate the statute in Roemhild.
The Oklahoma Statute
Because the Oklahoma statute falls under the more vague of the two sub-
categories of "equivalency" statutes, Oklahoma case law and Attorney General
Opinions must be consulted in order to obtain any understanding of the
statute's requirements. However, aside from providing a few rough guidelines,
these sources of information do not cure the statute of its vagueness. If
anything, they raise more questions in the mind of a citizen seeking to comply
with the law.
In Wright v. State,3" a defendant was convicted under the Oklahoma com-
pulsory education attendance law for failure to compel his minor child to
attend the public school of his district, or any private school, for two-thirds
of the time the private school was in session.3' The child's parents testified
that they were members of the Seventh Day Adventist Church and were training
their children at home to become ministers or missionaries. Both contended
that the public schools were not a proper atmosphere to achieve this end.
The evidence at trial showed that the mother was a graduate of a normal
training school and the father was an experienced teacher, having taught in
Kansas, Oklahoma, and the Philippines. The evidence also showed that the
child was unusually proficient in all subjects for a child of her age.
In reversing the conviction, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held
that as long as the child's education was not neglected, the parents had a
constitutional right to manage and supervise the child's education. As long
as this education was done in a fitting and proficient manner, the parents
would be in compliance with the statute.
36
The court also discussed the specific terms of the statute, noting that the
Oklahoma statute neither specifies the qualifications required of private school
teachers nor prescribes definite courses of study. Nonetheless, the court held
that so long as the education provided by the parents (wherever it may take
place) was supplied in good faith and was equivalent in fact to the education
provided by the state, the parents would not be in violation of the statute.
In addition, the good faith and equivalency requirements were questions of
fact to be determined by a jury." However, the court did not elaborate on
what criteria could be used by a parent or a jury in evaluating whether the
operated by a church on property which was within 100 yards of premises for which petitioner
sought a beer and wine license from a city was an institution in which traditional subjects and
learning associated with early grades of common public schools were taught. Therefore, the
kindergarten was held to be "school" within proscriptions of the ordinance and statute against
sale of beer and wine within 100 yards of any school.
34. 21 Okla. Crim. 430, 209 P. 179 (1922).
35. 7930 R.L. 1910, as amended by § 1, ch. 59, Okla. Sess. Laws of 1919 (which in substance
is the same as 70 OKLA. STAT. § 10-105 (1981).
36. 21 Okla. Crim. at 433-34, 209 P. 179 at 180.
37. Id., 209 P. at 180-81.
1985]
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education provided a child was equivalent in fact to that available from the
state.
In Sheppard v. State,38 the defendants were also convicted of violating
Oklahoma's compulsory education statute.3 9 The parents defended on the
grounds that the children were being taught in a building adjacent to their
home by the parents themselves and that this was a private school. Therefore,
the parents argued, they were in compliance with the statute. In reversing
the convictions, the Oklahoma Supreme Court built on the principles enun-
ciated in Wright and elaborated upon the burden of proof requirement in
a compulsory education statute prosecution. The court held that it is incum-
bent upon the prosecution to show that the children were withdrawn from
public school by their parents and not provided with other means of educa-
tion, or if such alternative education was provided, it was wholly inadequate
and not furnished in good faith. Absent this showing, the state will not have
made a prima facie case of a statutory violation."' However, the court once
again sidestepped the issue of criteria and guidelines in determining whether
an entity would be considered a school within the meaning of the statute,
or what equivalency entailed.
The constitutionality of Oklahoma's compulsory education statute was tested
in Hatch v. Goerke." In Hatch, the parents of a child who had attended
a public school brought suit against local school officials and the District
Attorney, alleging that their son was wrongfully dismissed from school for
failure to comply with a regulation that would require the cutting of their
son's Indian-braided hair. As a result of the expulsion, the parents were held
to have been in violation of the statute. The parents' complaint alleged that
the statute was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad on its face, and invalid
as applied."' Consequently, the parents maintained that the statute failed to
38. 306 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1957).
39. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 10-10 (1951) (which in substance is the same as 70 OKLA. STAT. §
10-105 (1981)).
40. Sheppard v. State, 306 P.2d at 357. But see Hill v. State, 410 So. 2d 431 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1982); People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 (Super. Ct. 1953); State
v. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60 (Iowa 1981); In re Falk, 110 Misc. 2d 104, 441 N.Y.S.2d 785,
82 A.2d 974 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981); In re Myers, 203 Misc. 549, 119 N.Y.S.2d 98 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1953) (cases placing the burden of proof upon the parents). See also Scoma v. Chicago Bd.
of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (holding that when a criminal statute sets forth
an exception that is not part of the crime, but operates to prevent an act otherwise included
in the statute from being a crime, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant); State v. Massa,
95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (Morris County Ct. 1967); State v. Vaughn, 44 N.J. 140,
207 A.2d 537 (1965) (cases splitting the burden of proof between the prosecution and the
defendants).
41. 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974).
42. Id. at 1191. In addition to the allegations discussed in the text of this note, the parents
also alleged that (1) local rules requiring the cutting of their son's Indian-braided hair violated
their parental rights to raise their children according to their own religious, cultural, and moral
values in violation of the first, fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution; (2) the
expulsion of their son without a hearing was a denial of fourteenth amendment procedural due




provide them fair notice as required by due process and was also an unconstitu-
tional delegation of discretion to the responsible authorities.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was not persuaded that the statute
was invalid. The court stated that the statute merely provided reasonable re-
quirements for compelling school attendance. As such, the purpose and scope
of the statute was clear and the claim of vagueness was untenable.
43
Oklahoma Attorney General Opinion 72-155 1 stated that the State Board
of Education, not the Oklahoma Education Association, is the proper certi-
fying authority, and that the State Board certifies only teachers and not tutors.
In addition, the opinion stated that the requirements of the Oklahoma statute
could be met by providing a means of education other than public or private
schools, but if contested, the equivalency of such education is a question of
fact for the jury in an action on the merits.
4
1
In Oklahoma Attorney General Opinion 73-129"6 several questions were
answered. 47 The Attorney General stated the Oklahoma compulsory atten-
dance statute does not require that a private school be accredited, or that
a private tutor hold a certificate, so long as the private instruction is supplied
in good faith and is equivalent in fact to that offered by the state. Second,
credit for private instruction may not be denied solely because the instructor
was not certified.48 Finally, the state is under a duty to supply only public
schools, not private schools, with materials and supplies.
The cases and Attorney General Opinions explain the requirements of the
statute in a cursory fashion. A series of vague rules are laid out, but no
guidelines are provided for determining whether the rules are being complied
the first amendment establishment and free exercise clauses. The court held all the parents' con-
tentions were properly dismissed except for the procedural due process and establishment and
free exercise clause arguments.
43. 502 F.2d at 1193.
44. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 155 (Okla. May 1, 1972). The question of whether it is possible
for a private tutor who has been certified by the Oklahoma Education Association as a teacher
to tutor twenty students and satisfy the compulsory school attendance statute was addressed.
This question was submitted by E.C. (Sandy) Sanders, State Representative, House of.Represen-
tatives, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
45. In rendering this opinion, the Attorney General cited 70 OKLA. STAT. § 10-105 (1981);
Sheppard v. State, 306 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1957); Wright v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 430, 209 P.
179 (1922).
46. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 129 (Okla. Feb. 13, 1974).
47. These questions were submitted by Dr. Leslie Fisher, State Superintendent of Public In-
struction, State Capitol Building, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The questions presented were: First,
if other than a public school is chosen by the parents, must it be accredited by the Oklahoma
State Department of Education? Second, if the parent chooses either to instruct the child himself
or provide a private tutor, must such parent or tutor be certified by the Department of Educa-
tion? Third, if such private tutoring by either a parent or a tutor is pursued, is the Board of
Education of a school district required to grant credits to be applied toward graduations, or
are such credits available only if the parent or teacher is certified? And, finally, if the child
is not attending a district-operated school, is he still entitled to be supplied with state purchased
textbooks, supplies, materials and/or equipment?
48. The opinion did state that the Board of Education has discretion to classify students
as it deems appropriate, and to require examinations relative thereto. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 129, at 26.
19851
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with. In a prosecution under the statute, the burden of proof is upon the
prosecution to show either that the child was provided with no education at
all, or that the education was not equivalent to that provided by the state.
Should the prosecution pursue this second option, the adequacy of such educa-
tion is a question of fact for the jury in a trial on the merits. Again, no
guidelines are provided to help the prosecution and the jury to determine
whether the burden of proof has been met.
A Need for Change
Oklahoma's compulsory education statute is unconstitutional for several
reasons. Because the statute fails to define the phrase "private school," it
is constitutionally deficient for the same reasons as the statutes cited in
Roemhild and Popanz. This is highlighted by the fact that there is still much
disagreement among the various jurisdictions as to what constitutes a private
school. Basically, there are two theories. One is that a private school is a
learning situation fulfilling only an academic function.4 9 A second theory main-
tains that in addition to providing academic training, a private school must
also provide socialization and group interaction."0
The Oklahoma statute is also vague in that it does not prescribe any criteria
or guidelines for determining what the phrase "other school" means. Nor
does the statute provide any definition as to what "other means of educa-
tion" are.
It can be argued that the category three "equivalency" statutes are more
descriptive and therefore less vague than the shorter, less-descriptive "no ex-
ception" statutes. By the inclusion of additional language like "other school"
and "other means of education," it is clear that the statutes encompass more
than just traditional education in an institutional setting. Arguably, the addi-
tional language of this type of statute helps to modify and clarify the actual
meaning of the phrase "private school." The additional requirements included
in a category-three statute can, however, be viewed as just more vague and
meaningless language. By making the statute appear to be more permissive,
it can be considered a trap for the unwary who may be unapprised of the
exact meaning and proscriptions of the statute."
49. See State v. Massa, 94 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (1967) (equivalent education re-
quires only the showing of academic equivalence, not group education or socialization); People
v. Levisen, 404 Il1. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950) (a school is a place where instruction is imparted
and is not dependent on the number of persons being taught, or on the particular manner and
place such education is provided).
50. See State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170 (1929) (holding that a private school in addi-
tion to being an institutional setting, must provide the child with socialization); State v. Counart,
69 Wash. 361, 124 P. 910 (1912) (holding that a private school means the same character of
school as the public school, a regular, organized and existing institution); In re Shinn, 195 Cal.
App. 2d 683, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1961). See also State v. Lowry, 191 Kan. 701, 383 P.2d 962 (1963).
51. This contention is supported in a recent law review article. In that article the author
maintains that "equivalency" statutes are much more vague and ambiguous than "no excep-
tion" statutes. As a result, there has been much more litigation in "equivalency" jurisdictions,




The Oklahoma statute may be more vague than the Wisconsin statute
because it does not explicitly provide for an equivalency requirement in the
statute. Instead, this requirement is drawn from case law and Attorney General
Opinions. In contrast, the Wisconsin statute explicitly provides for the
equivalency requirement in the statute, although the statute fails to adequately
define equivalence.
Perhaps both the Oklahoma and the Wisconsin statutes are unconstitution-
ally vague for a more basic reason. Although not discussed in Popanz, nor
in Oklahoma law, none of the statutes nor accompanying guidelines provide
any criteria individuals can use in determining whether the requirement of
equivalency has been met. At best, the present law presents a mere skeleton
of guidelines, requiring interested parents to guess at the rest. This conten-
tion is supported by the policies of the Oklahoma State Board of Education.
Ift administering the statute, the authorities discourage home education pro-
grams not because they are prohibited by the statute but because it is difficult
to determine equivalency. 2
Additionally, the concern in Roemhild and Popanz that a vague enforce-
ment section in the statute would impermissibly delegate enforcement power
to authorities on a subjective and ad hoc basis seems to be supported by the
facts in Sheppard. In Sheppard the prosecuting authority seemed to proceed
on the basis that since the children were not enrolled in a public or a private
school, there must be a violation of the statute. In this regard, he simply
ignored the portion of the statute that exempted children from attendance
at either a public or a private school if other means of education were pro-
vided.5 3 Granted, the court in Sheppard held that the supervisor of school
attendance was primarily responsible for enforcing the statute, but such viola-
tions need not exclusively be prosecuted by him."' However, the court held
that the prosecution's failure to establish whether other means of equivalent
education, other than public or private schools, was provided was detrimen-
tal to the state's case.5" Although the defendant's convictions were reversed,
the foregoing facts show the existence of the ad hoc enforcement dangers
specifically discussed in Roemhild and Popanz.
Finally, Hatch should not be used as precedent to uphold the constitutional-
ity of Oklahoma's statute for two reasons. First, a similar precedent existed
in Georgia, and this did not prevent the majority of the court from striking
down the Georgia statute. Second, in Hatch the vagueness issue was only
discussed superficially and no specific mention was made of the constitutional-
ity of the general terms utilized in the statute. The court found the purpose
and scope of the statute to be clear. It did not, however, hold that the defini-
tion of a private school, other school, or other means of education were
likewise clear.
52. Information obtained in a telephone conversation with J.D. Giddens, Assistant Superinten-
dent of Accreditation and Curriculum, Oklahoma State Department of Education.
53. 306 P.2d 346, 356 (Okla. 1957).
54. Id. at 351.
55. Id. at 356, 357.
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Conclusion
Because there is a strong possibility that the Oklahoma compulsory educa-
tion statute is unconstitutionally vague, the legislature should redraft it to
provide more specific guidelines as to what constitutes a private school, "other"
school, or other means of education. Provisions setting forth the criteria for
determining equivalency should be enacted. In providing such guidelines, the
court should consider the suggestions put forth in Roemhild16 In addition,
consideration should be given to requirements for approval of private schools,"
approval of home education programs," annual competency testing," fire and
safety requirements, 6 the language to be used in instructions given in other
than public schools,"2 and the possibility of requiring different criteria for
different levels of schooling."2
By providing such criteria and guidelines, the state legislature can cure the
Oklahoma compulsory education statute of its constitutional defects. As a
result, parents wishing to provide their children with alternatives to public
education will be on notice as to what the law requires of them." Also, law
enforcement officials, with specific standards at hand, will be better able to
enforce the compulsory attendance statute and promote the state's needs in
having such a law.64
Robert B. Caput
56. 251 Ga. 569, 308 S.E.2d at 158.
57. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.27.010 (1980).
58. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-104 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
59. See OR. REV. STAT. § 339.030(G)(b) (1973).
60. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-01 (1981).
61. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.080 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
62. See Bangor Baptist Church v. State, 549 F. Supp. 1208, 1230 (Me. 1982) (where the
court mentioned that the fact that the approval standards for secondary schools are prescribed
by statute did not preclude the Board of Education from adopting like administrative requirements
for the approval of elementary schools).
63. Parents may wish to send their children to other than public schools for many reasons.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Commonwealth v. Renfrow, 332 Mass. 492,
126 N.E.2d 109 (1955); In re Falk, 110 Misc., 2d 104, 441 N.Y.S.2d 785 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981);
In re Thomas H., 78 Misc. 2d 412, 357 N.Y.S.2d 384 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1974); State v. Riddle,
285 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1981) (all cases citing religious or moral beliefs against sending a child
to a public school). See also Gunnison Watershed School Dist. v. Funk, No. 81-JV-3 (Colo.
Dist. Ct., Gunnison County, Apr. 17, 1981) (parents chose home education because the nearest
public school was 34 miles away); State v. Chavis, 45 N.C. App. 438, 263 S.E.2d 356 (1980),
cert. denied, 300 N.C. 377, 267 N.E.2d 679 (1980); City of Akron v. Lane, 65 Ohio App. 2d
90, 416 N.E.2d 642 (1979) (parents felt that public schools were too traditional or conservative);
Conformity in the Classroom, SATURDAY REv., Nov. 1978, at 20 (article stating that the present
system of mass education promotes conformity, anti-intellectualism, passivity, alienation, classism,
and hierarchy); Why Our Schools Aren't Making the Grade, McCALIS, Sept. 1975; Woods, supra
note 9 (articles citing academic failure of our public school systems is the cause of their
unpopularity).
64. The state has been said to have several interests in compulsory education. See Should
Parents Be Allowed to Educate Their Kids at Home?, 89 INSTRUCTOR 30 (1979) (this article stated
that schools are necessary to ensure a literate populace, which is essential to a democratic society.
Schools are the most convenient and inexpensive places for children to learn. Society has the
responsibility to ensure that its citizens acquire the minimal competency necessary to function
in an increasingly complex economy.).
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